LABOR LAW: SUPREME COURT REFUSES
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF "NO-STRIKE" PROVISION IN
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
FRom the time the Supreme Court ratified the policy of federal
judicial enforcement of labor-management agreements through Section 801 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (TaftHartley),' an unresolved problem has lingered on the judicial horizon. Will a request for specific enforcement of a "no-strike" clause
under section 301 (a) prevail in a direct conflict with Section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act,2 which forbids federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes? Initial litigation of this question resulted in conflicting circuit court decisions s Last term in Sinclair
Ref. Co. v. Atkinson," the Supreme Court, in a five to three decision,
settled this conflict by unequivocally holding that Section 801 (a). of
%"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties. . . ." Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301 (a), 61
Stat. 156 (1947). 29 US.C. 185 (a) (1958).
In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the
Court construed the above quoted section to support enforcement of labor agreements
by both state and federal courts. The Lincoln Mills case was soon followed by the
"Triology" cases which clarified and reaffirmed the Court's position that § 301 (a)
expressed a federal policy to enforce labor-management agreements. See United
Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior S&Gulf Nay. Co., 36a U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel 9&Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
2 "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute (as these terms are herein defined), from doing, whether singly or in concert,
any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment. . . ." The Norris-LaGuardia Act (Anti-Injunction Act) §4, 47 Stat.
70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
3The first, second, and seventh circuits had held that § 301 (a) of Taft-Hartley did
not repeal § 4 of Norris-LaGuardia. W. L. Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, Local 25,
217 F.2d 6 (Ist Cir. 1954) (repeals by implication are not favored); A. H. Bull SS. Co.
v. Seafarers' Int'L. Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957) (breach of "no-strike" clause is
a labor dispute and § 301 (a) of Taft-Hartley does not repeal Norris-LaGuardia prohibition against issuance of injunction); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 290 F.2d 312
(7th Cir. 1961) (instant case).
The tenth circuit, on the other hand, held that § 301 of Taft-Hartley gave federal
district courts the power to issue injunctions against picketing in violation of nostrike clauses notwithstanding § 4 of Norris-LaGuardia. Teamsters Union, Local 795
v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1960), rev'd per curiam
370 U. S.711 (1962).
'370 US. 197 (1962).
... may
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the Taft-Hartley Act did not "impliedly repeal". Section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in labor-management contract enforcement
cases, and, therefore, no injunction could issue to specifically enforce a "no-strike" provision of a collective bargaining agreement.
Sinclair Refining Company (Sinclair) and the Oil, Chemical
and Atomic Workers International Union (Union) were parties to
a collective bargaining agreement which provided for compulsory
arbitration of certain "grievances" 5 and also contained a "no-strike"
pledge on the part of the union. Due to Union's alleged violation
of the no-strike clause,6 Sinclair brought this action under Section
301 (a) of Taft-Hartley, praying for temporary and permanent injunctions restraining Union and its members from breaking the nostrike clause in the future. The district court granted Union's
motion to dismiss7 on the ground that the relief sought was prohibited by Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal.8
The Norris-LaGuardia Act generally provides stringent pro.
cedural limitations on the issuance of injunctions in any case arising
from a labor dispute. Section 4 of the act categorically bans issuance
of injunctions against strikes and work stoppages in labor disputes.0
This act was passed by an aroused 72d Congress determined to immunize labor from management's ability to invoke judicial intervention in labor's efforts to organize, bargain collectively, and obtain
collective bargaining agreements. 10 Since its passage, the governmental hands-off policy it expresses has given way in .contemporary
6Arbitration was required over any difference regarding wages, hours or working
conditions arising within any plant or region of operations. 370 U.S. at 197.
6Sindair alleged that the union had violated their contract on nine separate
occasions by engaging in strikes and work stoppages over matters which were the
proper subject of arbitration under the agreement. Sinclair contended that Union's

past violations demonstrated their complete disregard of their contractual obligations
and consequently there was a great likelihood of similar breaches in the future from

which Sinclair had no adequate remedy at law to protect itself. 870 U.S. at 197.
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 187 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1960).
8Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 290 F.2d 312 Z7th Cir. 1961).

9The Norris-LaGuardia Act (Anti-Injunction Act) §4, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29

U.S.C. § 104 (1958).

"The Norris-LaGuardia Act is the epitome of the philosophy that the civil law

through the use of the injunction has no useful function in the field of labor rela.

tions. Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Hagv. L. Rav. 1482, 1484-85
(1959); Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 RocKY NIT. L.
REv. 247, 253 (1958); Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 MIcHs. L.
REv. 673, 676 (1961); Comment, 70 YAr L.J. 70, 96 (1960); Note, 18 WASH. & LE
L. R v. 329, 333 (1961). See generally SMrnT & MERRIFIELD, CASES ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW, § 3.12 (2d rev. ed. 1960).
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labor legislation to a more regulatory approach." Contrary to the
situation that existed in 1932, many current labor disputes are over
problems that arise after a collective bargaining agreement already
has been signed.'2 Consequently, Congress has become increasingly
concerned with peaceful enforcement of labor-management agreements and avoidance of the crippling effects of labor disputes. In
order to facilitate the enforcement of labor-management contracts,
Congress provided in Section 801 (a) of Taft-Hartley that suits for
contract violations could be brought in any federal district court
having jurisdiction of the parties. Enforceable arbitration agreements, as a result, have loomed large in importance and have been
called the- "king-pin 13 of federal labor policy.
If read alone, the broad grant of authority in section 301 (a)
would clearly seem to imply that federal courts can use all remedies
at their disposal, including injunctions, to enforce collective bargaining agreements. However section 301 (a) cannot be read alone;
it must be read within the context of its own historical development
as well as in conjunction with the pertinent provisions of other
legislation, including the clear commands of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. The legislative history of section 301 (a) indicates that at the
time of its passage, Congress was fully aware of the evils of labor injunctions and of the protective prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.' 4 Lower federal courts have generally recognized this awareness and accordingly have held that section 301 (a) was not meant as
-See Comment, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law: The Contemporary Role of Norris-LaGuardia,70 YALE L.J. 70 (1960), where it is stated that
".... congressional policy appears to have disregarded [the] aims [of Norris-LaGuardia],
since the regulatory framework created under the new acts assigns far-reaching adjudicatory and enforcement responsibilities to the federal courts." See, also Cox,
Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 Rocity MT. L. REV. 247,
254 (1958), where it is stated that "to an undefined extent the Norris-LaGuardia Act
has become an anachronism."
22Stewart, supra note 10, at 677-78, states that Congress in Norris-LaGuardia intended to free unions from equitable remedies in order to give them power to extract
an agreement in writing from the employer, and thus Norris-LaGuardia was not
intended to free unions from the one effective remedy after agreement was reached.
22370 U.S. at 226. See also United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co.,
368 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
US. 593 (1960); Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
24 In his dissenting opinion in the instant case Mr. Justice Brennan concedes that
Congress "considered and rejected 'the advisability of repealing the Norris-LaGuardia
Act insofar as suits based upon breach of collective bargaining agreements are
concerned...." 370 U.S. at 220. For a history of section 301 (a) see Comment, 70
YALE L.J. 70 (1960).
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a sub silentio authorization of injunctive relief.16 The Supreme
Court, however, while never having addressed itself directly to the
inevitable conflict which would arise between Section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia and Section 301 (a) of Taft-Hartley, had implied
that it would recognize limited exceptions to the unequivocal noinjunction mandates of Norris-LaGuardia if they fell within the
policy confines of Section 301 (a) of Taft-Hartley. Such inferences
Were reasonably justifiable from implications in two earlier landmark decisions, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River &
Ind. Ry.16 and Textiles Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills.7

In the Chicago River case, the Court held that Section 4 of
Norris-LaGuardia was not intended to prohibit injunctive relief
against a strike when compulsory arbitration was directed under
the Railway Labor Act. In so holding, the Supreme Court recognized that the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Railway Labor Act
were integral parts of the pattern of national labor legislation and,
consequently, the two acts had to be accommodated "so that the
obvious purpose in the enactment of each is preserved."'"

In

Lincoln Mills, the Court sanctioned specific enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate grievances.' 9 Mr. Justice
Douglas further stated that the substantive law to be applied in suits
25A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 932 (1957); W. L. Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, Local 25, 217 F.2d 6 (Ist

Cir. 1954); In re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 192 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1951); Baltimore
Contractors, Inc. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 188 F. Supp. 382 (Ef.. La. 1960); Alcoa
S.S. Co. v. McMdhon, 81 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd per curiam, 173 F.2d 567
(2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 821 (1949); Sound Lumber Co. v. Lumber
'Workers, Local 2799, 122 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1954). Contra: Teamsters Union,
Local 795 v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1960), reV'd
per curiam, 370 U.S. 711 (1962); American Smelting &Ref. Co. v. Tacoma Smeltermen's
Union, Local 25, 175 F. Supp. 750 (W.D. Wash. 1959); Johnson & Johnson v. Textile
Worker's Union, 184 F. Supp. 359 (D.N.J. 1960).
Cases where courts specifically enforced arbitration clauses are the weight of
authority, but where anti-strike injunctions were sought the weight of authority is
contrary. Comment, The Lincoln Mills Case and Specific Enforcement of No-Strike
Clauses in the Federal Courts, 25 U. CHL L. R v.496, 501 (1958).
16 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
19

17353 U.S. 448 (1957).

18 353 U.S. at 40.

Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out that failure to arbitrate was not one of the kinds
of acts listed in § 4 of Norris-LaGuardia and thus made unenjoinable by federal courts,
and further that Section 8 of Norris-LaGuardia indicates a federal policy in favor of
arbitration; in Lincoln Mills he also made his famous and much debated quid pro quo
statement:
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for
an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the legislation does more than
confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations. It expresses
a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of
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under section 301 (a) is federal law which the courts must "fashion '2 0

from the policy of our national labor law.
The specific question still left unsettled, however, was.whether a
federal court could issue an injunction to compel specific performance of a "no-strike" clause under Section 301 (a) of Taft-Hartley,
notwithstanding the express language in Sections 1 and 4 of NorrisLaGuardiaP'1 -Most- commentators had. anticipated that on the
basis of the implications in Chicago River and Lincoln Mills,
the Supreme Court would hold that a no-strike, clause was specifically enforceable.;In Sinclair, however-, the majority opinion did not follow
prognostications of the commentators. Short shrift was made of the
contention that the term "labor dispute" in the Norris-LaGuardia
Act does not include disputes arising out of a union's refusal to
abide by terms of a collective bargaining agreement.- Mr. Justice
Black stated that Sinclair's restrictive definition of "labor dispute"
rested more on what many commentators think the law should be
than upon a correct judicial interpretation of the express language
of Section 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Court found that
to issue an injunction to enforce a "no-strike" clause would run directly counter to the specific language of Section 4 of NorrisLaGuardia. 23 The majority concluded from a lengthy examination
or against labor organizatiofis and that industrial peace can be best obtained
only in that way. 853 US. at 455.
For a critical analysis of the majority's dismissal of the constitutional issue in
Lincoln Mills, see Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. Rzv. 1 (1957). It has been suggested that the
quid pro quo statement shows that the Court believed no-strike clauses were also
subject to specific enforcement. Comment, 25 U. Cm. L. REv.496, 499 (1958).
20 353 U.S. at 456.
-"For a discussion of four possible positions that can be taken in respect to the
conflict between § 301 (a) of Taft-Hartley and § 4 of Norris-LaGuardia, see 25 U. C.
L. RFv. 496 (1958).
,2GaRco y, LAnon AND nTm LAW 455-56 (2d rev. ed. 1958); Cox, supra note 11, at
252-56; Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 Mxcii. L. Rnv. 685, 637,
645 (1959); Hays, The Supreme Court and the Labor Law, October Term, 1959, 60
COLum. L. Rav. 901, 918 (1960); Stewart, supra note 10 at 683; Comment, 25 U. Cm.
L. R v.496, 506 (1958). But see Feinsinger, Enforcement of Labor Agreements-A
New Era in Collective Bargaining, 43 VA. L. Rav. 1261 (1957), for possible support
of Sinclair.
One court stated that "If that [Lincoln Mills] language means what it plainly says,
surely simple justice and common fairness would dictate that sauce for the goose be
such for the gander." American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union,
175 F. Supp. 750, 754 (W.D. Wash. 1959). Accord, Teamsters Union, Local 795 v.
Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1960).
23 Accord, Cox, supra note 11, at 253, where the author agrees that to enjoin a strike
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of the legislative history of Section 301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act
that Congress deliberately chose not to repeal the Norris-LaGuardia
Act when it considered section 301 (a). Hence, reasoned the Court,
neither was section 301 (a) meant to "repeal" section 4 in contract
enforcement cases, and, accordingly, the courts were not intended
to have the power to "'accommodate' that act out of existence." 2'
In distinguishing the Chicago River case, the Court pointed out that
there the strike was called in defiance of a required duty to arbitrate
imposed by the Railway Labor Act; while in the instant case, a quite
different law was involved which did not compel a specific, exclusive
method for settling disputes. Lincoln Mills was distinguished on
the ground that a mandatory injunction to carry out an agreement
to arbitrate did not enjoin any of the kinds of conduct which NorrisLaGuardia withdrew from the injunctive powers of the U.S. courts.
The majority opinion concluded by saying that section 301 (a) does
not conflict with the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia
because the employer can still obtain an order compelling arbitration. 25 The Court states that if it is desirable for the mandates of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act to be changed, it is up to Congress to do it.
- The dissent,26 while agreeing that Section 301 (a) of the TaftHartley Act did not repeal Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
argued that the two sections do coexist and do apply in the instant
case in apparently conflicting senses. Consequently, Mr. Justice
Brennan asserted that the Court should have resolved this conflict
through accommodation as was done in the Chicago River case
and, in this instance, allow the issuance of an injunction.27 The
dissent pointed out that the Court could have arrived at a different
would fly in the face of the plain words of § 4 of Norris.LaGuardia. See also Baltimore
Contractors, Inc. v. Carpenter's District Council, 188 F. Supp. 382, 383 (E.D. La. 1950),
where the court stated that "it is one thing to get around procedural rules when they
appear 'inapposite' and quite another to ride roughshod over a categorical prohibition."
24 370 U.S. at 209.
2
rSee Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 270 U.S. 238 (1962); Drake Bakeries v. Local 50,
American Bakers & Confectionary Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962). See also Isaacson, The
Grand Equation: Labor Arbitration and the the No-Strike Clause, 48 A.B.A.J. 914, 917
(1962).
-"It is interesting to note that Justice Douglas, who wrote the majority opinion
in Lincoln Mills, sided with the dissenters in the instant case; this presumably indicates that he felt the majority's attempts to distinguish Lincoln Mills were not
successful.
17370 U.S. at 216. Cox, supra note 11, at 254-56, points out that there is a judicial
tendency to curtail the anti-injunction law in favor of implementing later legislation
creating legal rights and duties, and states that reading an exception in Norris.
LaGuardia will not necessarily revive the evils of the labor injunction.
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result without frustrating the basic intents of either act if it had
interpreted the legislative history differently. 28 Since Section 801 (a)
of Taft-Hartley grants concurrent jurisdiction to state and federal
courts to enforce labor-management agreements, Mr. Justice Brennan called attention to the uncertainty that the Sinclair decision
creates concerning the role of the state courts relative to enforcement
of collective bargaining agreements under Section 301 (a) of TaftHartley.2 1
Initial reaction to Sinclair has been generally unfavorable o
The most common criticism seems to be that the decision offends
fuhdamental fairness by granting dissimilar and unequal remedies. 3 '
Labor can specifically require management to arbitrate a dispute, but
28

Rice, A Paradox of Our National Labor Law, 34 MAuq.. L. Rv. 233, 248 (1951).

asserts there is nothing in the legislative history of Norris-LaGuardia itself that indicates whether it was intended to restrict remedies for breach of contract duties. Cox,
supra note 11, at 255, argues that the situation in Chicago River was an exact
parallel to the type involved in the instant case. See also Stewart, si pra note 10, at
679.
' If a state court can still issue injunctions to enforce no.strike clauses, then
employers can be expected to rush to them and the Lincoln Mills command to the
federal courts to fashion a uniform, coherent body of substantive federal law will be
dealt a harsh blow. On the other hand, if a state court is precluded by the decision
in the instant case from issuing injunctions to enforce no-strike clauses, an important
remedy that existed before the decision in this case will be denied employers. 370
U.S. at 226-27. Application of the Sinclair rule to preclude state courts from granting
injunctions is not unlikely. See Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 869
U.S. 95 (1962) (under § 301 (a) a suit for violation of a collective agreement in either
a federal or a state court is governed by federal law).
Compare McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal.2d
45, 315 P.2d 822 (1957), where a contractor sued to enjoin a strike in breach of a collective bargaining agreement. Traynor, J., held that merely because the suit could
have been brought in a federal court and the federal court would have been precluded from issuing an injunction did not stop the California courts from issuing
injunctions. Some of the ramifications of this interesting case are discussed in 71
HAaV. L. Ra-v. 1172 (1958). See also Isaacson, supra note 25, at 919; Comment, 18
WAsr. 9- LEE L. REv. 329, 335 (1961); Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 70, 100 (1960).
20 "This week's decision, in maintaining a patent discrimination, plus a morally
offensive law, leaves the state courts to restore some measure of justice and ethics to
the situation. And since this will create a crazy quilt of conflicting decisions, the
Supreme Court's reversion this week from moral arbiter of the nation to laissez-faire
tolerator of a basic wrong has struck two crippling blows at arbitration as a settlement process in labor disputes." Krock, In the Nation-Sauce for One Side Only in
Labor Contracts, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1962, § L, p. 24. See also U.S. News & World
Report, July 2, 1962, p. 88.

at See Comment, 25 U. Cm. L. Rav. 496, 501 (1958); U.S. News & World Report,
supra note 30.
Although Norris-LaGuardia was intended mainly as a protection for union and
employee activities, where its terms can be read to include employer conduct that
conduct should be protected. Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Electric
Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956), aff'd 353 U.S. 547 (1957). See also Textile Workers
of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), where the Supreme Court by its
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management cannot enjoin labor's violation of its no-strike pledges
in event of a dispute.

Certainly- the dissent and the commentators are justified in
charging that a great blow has been dealt to the strongly encouraged
policy of grievance arbitration. The employer will, of course, still
have the remedies of damages and specific enforcement of arbitration
agreements,3 2 but the protections afforced by these remedies when
the union is free to strike without judicial interference are not of the
variety most conducive to persuade management to agree to grievance arbitration in return for a no-strike clause.P Consequently,
the ideal of a coherent body of substantive law to be developed by
federal courts on enforcement of collective bargaining agreements
has been tarnished.

It is submitted that although the decision in Sinclair is probably
required under general rules of strict statutory construction and can
be defended on grounds of judicial restraint, it is not a happy result.
Nevertheless, some good may come of the instant decision if it serves
as a stimulus to force Congress to reconsider and reevaluate the role
of Norris-LaGuardia in light of modern day labor-management relations.
concern with whether Norris-LaGuardia prohibits issuance of an injunction requiring
an employer to arbitrate seems to accept the idea that Norris-LaGuardia can also be
used by employers. Consequently, one wonders what the Court would hold if an
employer, in violation of a "no-lockout" clause, dosed down his plant when it came
time to arbitrate a grievance; would specific performance of the "no-lockout" clause
be granted the union?
32 Supra note 25.
a3The only affirmative obligation that flows from the union to the employer is the
no-strike clause, and this clause is of little value unless it is enforced. Stewart, supra
note 10, at 673-74. 33 RocKY MT. L. Xv. 435 (1961), asserts that damages for breach
of a no-strike clause are inadequate.

